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The Morality of Prophylactic Legislation
(with Special Reference to Speed Limits,
Assisted Suicide, Torture, and
Detention Without Trial)
Michael C. Dorf *

Prophylactic Legislation Deﬁned
My subject is the morality of prophylactic legislation. What do I mean
by ‘prophylactic’ legislation? Let me illustrate the concept by drawing a
contrast with the most famous hypothetical case in the scholarly literature of Anglo-American jurisprudence. During the course of their debate
over the relation between law and morality, Lon Fuller and H. L. A. Hart
disagreed about what tools are needed to discern the meaning and scope
of a rule barring vehicles from a public park.¹ Hart and Fuller clashed
over whether legislative purpose and considerations of morality enter into
the process of discerning what Hart famously called the ‘core of settled
meaning’.² They themselves did not disagree about the fact that there will
be cases at the margin of this and every rule, but the example has since
come to illustrate the various positions one can take on marginal applications, especially the following question: when, if ever, should ambiguous
statutory language be construed to reach circumstances that were not
speciﬁcally contemplated by the legislature?
My topic concerns the relation between law and morality, but in a
somewhat diﬀerent sense from the way in which Hart, Fuller, and others
have mooted these issues. For one thing, I am interested in the question
of whether a legislature ought to enact a law, not in how judges should
* The author thanks Sherry Colb and Elizabeth Emens for very helpful conversations,
and Jessica Karp for excellent research assistance.
¹ Compare L. L. Fuller, ‘Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart’
(1958) 71 Harvard Law Review, 663 with H. L. A. Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of
Law and Morals’ (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review, 607–8.
² Hart, ibid, 607.
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construe laws once they are enacted. For another, I am setting aside the difﬁculty of unforeseen circumstances and focusing on problems to which
the legislature accurately foresees the range of applications of its legislation, although not the identities of the individuals to whom it will apply.
‘Prophylactic legislation’, as I shall use the term, refers to laws that the
legislature deliberately writes so as to cover not only cases presenting the
mischief it targets, but also some cases in which the legislature knows that
the law’s background justiﬁcation fails.
Why would a rational legislature deliberately write a law that applies to
circumstances in which the law is unjustiﬁed? A legislature might rationally decide to over-extend its reach for a number of reasons. It might fear
that a more narrowly targeted law would be under-inclusive, and that the
dangers from under-inclusion outweigh those from over-inclusion. Or,
as I shall elaborate in greater detail shortly, the legislature might choose
an over-inclusive rule rather than a potentially better targeted standard,
because the legislature worries that the standard would confer too much
discretion on those who execute and interpret it.
Thus, prophylactic legislation will often be rational but, I shall argue,
it nonetheless raises profound moral questions whenever it jeopardizes
fundamental interests for, by deﬁnition, it does so without suﬃcient justiﬁcation in the circumstances to which the legislation’s background purpose does not apply. Whether the moral questions can be answered, I shall
argue further, depends in large part on whether reasonable people behind
a veil of ignorance could be expected to assent to the prophylactic legislation. I shall explore these questions using four principal examples: speed
limits; assisted suicide; torture; and detention without trial.

Speed Limits and the Ubiquity of
Prophylactic Legislation³
Nearly all laws, and especially those that take the form of rules rather
than standards, are prophylactic. Speed limits are a well-known example.
When Parliament speciﬁes the motorway speed limit of 70 miles per hour,
it understands that some drivers are capable of driving safely at higher
speeds. Nonetheless, a law requiring all drivers to drive at ‘no greater than
the maximum speed at which each individual driver can drive safely, taking account of all the relevant conditions’, would be nearly impossible
³ See D. A. Strauss, ‘The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules’ (Winter 1998) 55 University
of Chicago Law Review, 190–209.
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to enforce because of its ambiguity. Furthermore, even apart from ambiguity as perceived by the police, regulating motorway speed via a ﬂexible standard rather than a rigid rule would sacriﬁce the coordination
advantages that rules can confer. Even allowing for diﬀerent degrees of
compliance among the driving population, a 70-mile-per-hour rule will
do a better job of moving the traﬃc along at roughly the same speed than
will an open-ended ‘drive at a safe speed’ standard.
Thus, in the speed limit example, as in much of law, the optimal rule is
sub-optimal with respect to some individuals; but the rule as a whole may
still be optimal among the set of all possible rules or standards because no
rule or standard can be perfect. After all, legislative goals routinely conﬂict with one another. A speed limit balances motorists’ interest in safety
against their interest in arriving at their destinations quickly. Regulating
speed via a rule rather than a standard has the virtues of precision and
enforceability but the corresponding vices of over- and under-inclusion
with respect to very skilled and unskilled drivers respectively; meanwhile,
a standard has the opposite virtues and vices.⁴
The prophylactic nature of speed limits—that is, the fact that they
require some people to drive more slowly than necessary for safety—does
not by itself make speed limits morally objectionable. To be sure, someone
could raise a plausible moral objection against a speed limit on the ground
that it is too high. Reducing the speed limit from 70 miles per hour to 55
miles per hour would save lives and would mitigate harm to the environment. Slower speed limits mean fewer and less severe collisions, while
(within the range of speeds at which people typically drive), fuel eﬃciency
increases as speed decreases.⁵ Burning fuel more eﬃciently means pumping less carbon dioxide and other pollutants into the atmosphere.⁶ Thus,
one could argue that reducing speed limits is a moral imperative, insofar
as human lives and the health of the planet should trump the convenience
that results from faster driving.
I am not now interested in whether the moral arguments for reducing
the motorway speed limit from 70 to 55 miles per hour (or some other ﬁgure) are persuasive. I only mean to concede that they are comprehensible
⁴ The literature on rules and standards is enormous. For two works by American
scholars that nicely capture the core issues, see K. M. Sullivan, ‘The Supreme Court, 1991
Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards’ (1992) 106 Harvard Law Review,
66–9; and F. Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based
Decision-Making in Law and in Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).
⁵ See Committee on the Eﬀectiveness and Impact of Corporate Average Fuel Economy
(CAFE) Standards, et al, Eﬀectiveness and Impact of Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE)
Standards (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2002), 77.
⁶ Ibid, 63.
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and plausible as moral arguments. Such arguments, however, do not take
aim at the prophylactic nature of speed limits. The claim that the speed
limit should be reduced is a claim that the law as it now stands is underinclusive, not a claim that it is over-inclusive.
By contrast, claims that the speed limit is too low do genuinely target
the prophylactic nature of speed limits. Yet these arguments probably
should not qualify as moral arguments, and even if they do, I imagine
they will strike most people as very unpersuasive moral arguments. To
argue for increasing the speed limit (or against decreasing it) in moral
terms, notwithstanding the cost in human lives and to the environment, requires one to stake out a very strongly libertarian position. In
the United States, some libertarians object to laws requiring motorists to
wear seatbelts or motorcyclists to wear helmets on the ground that individuals should be permitted to choose for themselves how to evaluate
the costs and beneﬁts of beltless or helmetless driving.⁷ Yet even strong
libertarians recognize that harm to others counts as a reason for limiting freedom.⁸ Speed limits do not merely protect you against yourself;
they beneﬁt everyone through their pollution-reducing eﬀect and they
protect innocent third parties—other drivers, passengers, and pedestrians—against unsafe driving.⁹
It would take not just a libertarian but a full-ﬂedged anarchist to insist
upon a moral right to drive as fast as one believes one can safely operate
one’s vehicle, when the cost of aﬀording people that right will be measured in serious injuries, lost lives, and harm to the environment. In setting
the speed limit at 70 rather than 55 or at 55 rather than 45, the legislature
can choose to give some weight to interests in shorter driving times, but
in doing so, it is not responding to moral concerns as such.
Alternatively, if you prefer, we might say that the moral concerns raised
by the driver who wishes to travel very fast are easily outweighed by the
⁷ See, e.g., T. Balaker, ‘Strapped. Unbuckling Seat Belt Laws’ (27 May 2004) Reason
Magazine Online, at <http://www.reason.com/news/show/32805.html> (on ﬁle with
author).
⁸ See, e.g., J. Sullum, ‘An Epidemic of Meddling, The Totalitarian Implications of
Public Health’ (May 2007) 39 Reason Magazine, 23–32 (quoting J. S. Mill’s On Liberty:
‘The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others’).
⁹ I take no position on the question whether a strong libertarian could also support
seatbelt laws and helmet laws on the ground that persons who suﬀer more severe injuries
as a result of beltless and helmetless driving in fact impose a cost on others through the
diversion of medical care and the loss of their productivity. I am not a strong libertarian,
and thus I accept paternalistic justiﬁcations for seatbelt and helmet laws.
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countervailing considerations of safety and environmental protection.
All constraints on liberty, we might say, raise prima facie moral concerns.
In this view, just as a conscientious doctor attempts to ‘ﬁrst do no harm’,
so a conscientious legislator ought to ‘ﬁrst infringe no liberty’. Of course,
good doctors do harm all the time, in the sense that they expose patients
to serious risks, but they do so only where they calculate that the expected
beneﬁts of the course of treatment outweigh those risks. Likewise, if we
take seriously the strong libertarian’s moral objection to any speed limits,
we might say that a good legislator votes for legislation only when its
beneﬁts outweigh the resulting sacriﬁce of liberty. ‘First infringe no liberty’ would thus mean only ‘do not infringe liberty gratuitously’. One can
readily accept such a dictum—and thus accept that all liberty-infringing
legislation poses a prima facie moral issue—without thereby accepting
that all liberty-infringing legislation poses a serious moral issue.

Assisted Suicide
The picture looks very diﬀerent, however, where the liberty at stake is
fundamental in some sense. In American constitutional law, the term
‘fundamental rights’ has a technical meaning, but I do not mean anything
technical here.¹⁰ A fundamental liberty, as I use the term, means only a
liberty that a particular legislator is willing to regard as very important.
The liberty to drive at 80 rather than 70 (or 70 rather than 55) miles per
hour will count as fundamental for almost no-one. The liberty to which
I turn now, however, will rank as fundamental for many legislators and
others.
Consider laws that impose criminal punishment on anyone who voluntarily hastens another person’s death—even where the dying person
is competent, in the late stages of a terminal illness, and experiencing
physical discomfort that cannot be relieved by palliative care. Some

¹⁰ The term refers to those rights, whether speciﬁcally enumerated in the Bill of Rights
or inferred from the general protection of the Due Process Clauses, that receive special
substantive protection. See, e.g., Moore v City of E. Cleveland 431 US 494, 499, 506, 97 SC
1932, 1935, 1939 (1977) (recognizing a right to family deﬁnition). See also M. R. Konvitz,
Fundamental Rights: History of a Constitutional Doctrine (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction
Publishers/Rutgers University, 2001), 43–58 (detailing the development of fundamental
rights jurisprudence). In recent years, the Supreme Court has tended not to use the language of fundamental rights: see, e.g., Lawrence v Texas 539 US 558, 123 SC 2472 (2003);
but since I am not using the term in its technical sense, that is of no concern here.
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democracies, including Belgium,¹¹ the Netherlands,¹² Switzerland,¹³ and
one state in the United States—Oregon¹⁴—permit physician-assisted
suicide under such circumstances, but many countries, including the
United Kingdom and the United States outside Oregon, prohibit the
practice.¹⁵ As with all laws, no doubt the legislators who voted for current prohibitions (or voted against repealing them), did so for a variety
of complicated reasons.
Some such reasons may be non-consequentialist: a legislator or the
constituents she represents may believe that life is a precious gift from
God that only God can rightfully withdraw; or the legislator or his constituents may think that suicide is always wrong for secular reasons. I have
little doubt that this sort of reason ﬁgures in the decisions of some actual
lawmakers who favour criminal prohibition of assisted suicide. And to
the extent that one ﬁnds this sort of reason persuasive, it overcomes any
moral objections that an individual who wishes for assistance in dying
may have: if such assistance is itself wrong, then there can be no fundamental right to receive it.
I shall bracket non-consequentialist objections to physician-assisted suicide, both because such objections, if religiously based, raise another set of
questions about the proper relation between religious motivation and legislation, and because, as we have just seen, there is no dilemma at all if we admit
non-consequentialist reasons.¹⁶ I shall focus instead on consequentialist reasons for favouring criminal penalties for assisted suicide.

¹¹ Euthanasia Law (Loi relative à l’euthanasie) 28 May 2002. For a brief description of
the law, see P. Meller, ‘Euthanasia Ban Ends’ New York Times, 24 September 2002, A13.
¹² Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act (Wet
toetsing levensbeëindiging op verzoek en hulp bij zelfdoding) 2002. An English translation of
the Act is available on the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs website, at <http://www.
minbuza.nl/binaries/minbuza_core_pictures/pdf/c/c_55024.pdf>.
¹³ Swiss Penal Code 1942, Art. 115 criminalizes assisted suicide only where the motive
is selﬁsh. For an overview of Swiss assisted suicide law and practice, see S. A. Hurst and
A. Mauron, ‘Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in Switzerland: Allowing a Role for NonPhysicians’ (1 February 2003) 326 British Medical Journal, 271–3.
¹⁴ Death with Dignity Act 1997.
¹⁵ Washington v Glucksberg, 521 US 702, 710, 117 SC 2258, 2263 (1997) (‘[i]n almost
every State—indeed, in almost every western democracy—it is a crime to assist a suicide’).
See also R. Cohen-Almagor, ‘Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Democratic
World: A Legal Overview’ (Winter 2003) 16 New York International Law Review, 1–41.
For a comparative overview of euthanasia policy that includes Asia, South America, and
the Middle East, see J. M. Scherer and R. J. Simon, Euthanasia and the Right to Die: A
Comparative View (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littleﬁeld, 1999).
¹⁶ I should add in the interest of full disclosure that I do not ﬁnd the deontological
objection to all instances of assisted suicide persuasive, even though I do ﬁnd some deontological arguments persuasive.
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Consequentialist reasons for regarding legal assisted suicide with disfavour may include any or all of the following concerns:
(i) that adequate palliative care will not be made available because
suicide will come to be seen as an acceptable and substantially less
expensive alternative;
(ii) that family members or doctors will exert pressure on patients to
hasten their deaths;
(iii) that such pressure will be most acute for women, minorities, and
especially the disabled;
(iv) that society more generally will place less value on the lives of the
severely disabled; and
(v) that the medical profession will lose its focus on the preservation
of health and life.
It is by no means clear that any or all of these reasons in fact justify banning assisted suicide, even if we look only at aggregate eﬀects. For example,
there is good reason to think that assisted suicide bans themselves impede
eﬀective palliative care. Even in jurisdictions that accept the principle of
‘double eﬀect’—under which a doctor may prescribe whatever dose of
narcotic is needed to ease pain, even if that dose kills the patient along
with her pain—healthcare workers frequently under-medicate pain for
fear that they will be unable to mount a successful double-eﬀect defence
if prosecuted.¹⁷ Legalization of assisted suicide, under this reasoning,
enhances rather than undermines the quality of palliative care.
Likewise with respect to the question of professional role, it is by no
means clear that the appropriate stance for doctors should always be in
favour of prolonging life. We might well worry that doctors who must
categorically decline to assist their patients in taking so-called ‘active’
measures to end their lives will also be reluctant to ‘let them die’, a right
that is typically safeguarded, even in jurisdictions in which assisted suicide is prohibited.¹⁸ Accordingly, prohibitions on assisted suicide may
have a deleterious impact on physician respect for patient autonomy.
¹⁷ See J. K. Rogers, ‘Punishing Assisted Suicide: Where Legislatures Should Fear to Tread’
(1994) 20 Ohio Northern University Law Review, 657 (noting practice of under-medicating
due to fear of litigation despite double-eﬀect exception). See also B. A. Rich, ‘The Politics
of Pain: Rhetoric or Reform?’ (2005) 8 DePaul Journal of Health Care Law, 519 (‘The result
of widespread and highly publicized disciplinary proceedings against physicians for purported “overprescribing” has been the encouragement of . . . underprescribing’).
¹⁸ I use scare quotes because I doubt that disconnecting a patient from artiﬁcial hydration or respiration can be accurately characterized as passively ‘letting die’. The act of ‘pulling the plug’ is an act, not an omission, as we can readily see by imagining that an assassin
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I could go on adducing reasons why one might conclude that, when one
tallies the costs and beneﬁts, assisted suicide ought to be legal. However,
I shall assume for the sake of argument that, on balance and by whatever
consequentialist calculus one uses to make these judgements, the mix of
costs and beneﬁts associated with prohibition of assisted suicide is preferable to the mix of costs and beneﬁts associated with legalization of assisted
suicide. Even so, prohibition raises moral questions because the conscientious legislator knows that, for some number of patients, the costs of prohibition clearly outweigh the beneﬁts, with the result that such patients
must undergo excruciating suﬀering without adequate justiﬁcation as to
their circumstances. Such patients raise a moral objection to the prophylactic nature of the assisted suicide ban.
To make the objection concrete, let us imagine a terminal patient
whom I shall call James Poe.¹⁹ Poe’s suﬀering cannot be addressed by
narcotic drugs. (Perhaps he suﬀers from nausea or respiratory distress.)
Thus, he cannot take advantage of the double-eﬀect loophole in most
assisted-suicide prohibitions. Let us imagine further that Poe has suﬃcient wealth to pay any and all medical costs associated with his further
treatment but no heirs who are pressuring him to die. Suppose that Poe is
not a member of any socially disadvantaged group (other than the group
of people suﬀering from excruciating and terminal medical conditions)
and is adjudged by psychiatric experts to be of sound mind. Finally, let us
suppose that Poe unequivocally and consistently expresses his desire for
medication that will kill him painlessly and as soon as possible. Denying
him assistance (from a doctor or anyone else) in obtaining such medication sacriﬁces his fundamental interest in avoiding suﬀering, for the beneﬁt of others—those who would be at the receiving end of inappropriate
pressure to end their lives were assisted suicide legal.
Is it a suﬃcient answer to Poe to tell him that, although the rule forbidding assisted suicide deprives him of his fundamental interest in avoiding suﬀering, that grave harm cannot be avoided without causing greater
harm to others? Poe will no doubt object that he is not responsible for
the unfortunate condition of those other people, so that it is unfair to
require him to bear the costs of the deliberately over-inclusive—that

pulled the plug of his mortal enemy without the enemy’s consent. The assassin would be
guilty of the act of murder. The diﬀerence between this case of killing without consent and
pulling the plug with consent is not the diﬀerence between an act and an omission but the
diﬀerence between an act to which consent is withheld and one to which consent is given.
¹⁹ See Compassion in Dying v Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 795 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc),
reversed by Washington v Glucksberg, note 15 above.
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is, prophylactic—prohibition on assisted suicide, when the beneﬁts go
exclusively to others.
I can tell you how the American legal system would address this question were it presented as an issue of constitutional law. The US Supreme
Court rejected this sort of claim in a pair of 1997 decisions, holding that
the right to physician aid in dying is not a fundamental right in the technical sense of that term. Consequently, the Court did not demand a truly
compelling justiﬁcation from the legislatures of the states of Washington
and New York.²⁰ But even if the Court had found that Poe had a fundamental right, that would not have ended the inquiry.²¹ The Court would
have faced the further question whether the states had advanced suﬃciently strong justiﬁcations for the prohibitions.²² In technical language,
the Court would have asked whether the prohibitions were the ‘least
restrictive means’ of advancing a ‘compelling interest’.²³
In some sense, that’s just legalese for the proposition that when the
government infringes on very important liberties, it must have very good
reasons for doing so. Even if the putative right to assisted suicide does
not lead courts to examine the reasons given for its prohibition—as it
would not in either the United States²⁴ or the United Kingdom²⁵—we
would nonetheless expect legislators in any constitutional democracy to
ask themselves whether they have very good reasons for enacting laws that
infringe on very important liberties such as Poe’s claimed right of assisted
suicide. To borrow the doctrinal test described above, we would want
legislators to ask whether there is a less restrictive means of accomplishing the obviously important ends of protecting patients against coercion,
ensuring the availability of palliative care, and so forth.
²⁰ See Washington v Glucksberg, ibid, 728, 2271; Vacco v Quill 521 US 793, 799, 809,
117 SC 2293, 2297, 2302 (1997).
²¹ For an outline of the steps in fundamental rights analysis, see E. Chemerinsky,
Constitutional Law (New York: Aspen Law and Business, 2002), 764–8.
²² See, e.g., Roe v Wade 410 US 113, 155, 93 SC 705, 728 (1973) (‘Where certain
“fundamental rights” are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights
may be justiﬁed only by a “compelling state interest”, and that legislative enactments
must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake’) (citations
removed).
²³ See, e.g., Sable Communications of California, Inc. v FCC, 492 US 115, 126, 109
SC 2829, 2836 (1989) (permitting restriction of fundamental rights ‘in order to promote a compelling interest if [the government] chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest’); see also Chemerinsky, note 21 above, 767 (‘[i]f a right is
deemed fundamental, the government must present a compelling interest to justify an
infringement’).
²⁴ See Washington v Glucksberg, note 15 above; Vacco v Quill, note 20 above.
²⁵ See, e.g., R (Pretty) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2001] UKHL 61, [2001] 3
WLR. 1598 (denying terminally ill woman’s request to allow her husband to assist her
suicide).
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In other words, we would want the conscientious legislator to ask
whether the burden on Poe is truly necessary to gain the beneﬁts that
accrue to others from a prohibition on assisted suicide. The answer
appears to turn on a further, empirical question: would it be possible to
gain the advantages of a ban on assisted suicide through means short of
outright prohibition, for example via stringent regulation and expanded
government funding for palliative care? Even though we have been
assuming that the aggregate beneﬁts of the assisted suicide ban outweigh
its aggregate costs, the answer to this question might still be yes. That is
to say, it is possible that the beneﬁts of an outright ban on assisted suicide
outweigh its costs, but that regulations falling short of an outright ban
would provide the same beneﬁts with fewer costs. In that case, it would
appear to be impossible to justify the prophylactic ban on assisted suicide
as applied to Poe (absent the sort of absolute deontological objections to
assisted suicide that I have bracketed). For, in his case, the ban operates
as pure cost.
Suppose, however, that the complete ban on assisted suicide truly is
optimal with respect to aggregate costs and beneﬁts, so that the legislature cannot make exceptions for people like Poe without opening the
door to the sorts of pressures on others that it ﬁnds unacceptable. By
whatever measure a legislator uses to determine such things—aggregate
pleasures minus pains, say, or ‘utiles’—the harms from permitting any
exceptions outweigh the beneﬁts. Even so, presumably Poe would still
object in exactly the terms I stated above: why should he have to endure
excruciating pain to prevent third parties over whom he has no inﬂuence from harming other third parties with whom he has no relationship?
Anglo-American law traditionally imposes no duty to rescue strangers,²⁶
and even in those jurisdictions that depart from the traditional rule, there
is no duty to rescue strangers where doing so would entail excruciating
pain.²⁷ Both the traditional rule and the limited nature of the departures

²⁶ See Keeton et al, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts (St. Paul, Minnn: West, 1984),
374 (‘the law has persistently refused to impose on a stranger the moral obligation . . . to go
to the aid of another’).
²⁷ See, e.g., Vermont Stat. Ann. tit. 12 s 519(a) (1973) (‘[a] person who knows that
another is exposed to grave physical harm shall, to the extent that the same can be rendered
without danger or peril to himself . . . give reasonable assistance’) (emphasis added); Rhode
Island Gen. Laws ss. 11–56–1 (1956) (‘[a]ny person at the scene of an emergency who
knows that another person is exposed to, or has suﬀered, grave physical harm shall, to the
extent that he or she can do so without danger or peril to himself or herself or to others, give reasonable assistance’) (emphasis added).
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in those jurisdictions that depart, indicate that such sacriﬁces are, in the
language of moral philosophy, supererogatory.

Torture
Answering Poe’s objection would seem to be an urgent matter, because
the inability to justify prophylactic legislation would undermine much
of what the state does—and much of what I think most sensible people
would want it to do.
So, can the state give a persuasive answer to Poe? That may depend
on how we understand the nature of the prohibition on assisted suicide. We might put Poe’s objection in its strongest form with an analogy
to torture. Suppose that John Doe is a perfectly healthy, completely
innocent person who has the misfortune to be the son of a kidnapper threatening to kill another group of completely innocent people
that she is holding captive. Could the state torture Doe in order to
induce his mother to free her captives? The standard answer in moral
philosophy—and one that certainly comports with my own moral
intuition—is no.
Poe can claim that his situation is indistinguishable from Doe’s. By
threatening doctors with criminal liability if they assist him in hastening his death, the state prolongs Poe’s agony—in eﬀect tortures him—in
order to prolong the lives of other people, those who do not desire aid
in dying but would be pressured to end their lives prematurely under a
regime of legal assisted suicide. The state can no more torture the innocent Poe through its criminal laws, he says, than it can torture the innocent Doe by hiring a Torquemada.
Not everyone will ﬁnd this analogy persuasive, and it is tempting simply to dismiss it by relying on something like the act/omission distinction. When the state hires Torquemada actually to torture Doe, the state
is taking action. By contrast, even if a law forbidding assisted suicide is
not exactly an omission, the state may appear to us to be less responsible
for Poe’s suﬀering than for Doe’s. After all, the state does not inﬂict Poe’s
suﬀering; his underlying medical condition does. The state does forbid
Poe from obtaining assistance in taking the one measure, suicide, that
would relieve his suﬀering but, unlike in Doe’s case, Poe’s suﬀering is
merely the unfortunate by-product of the state’s cost-justiﬁed policy. By
contrast, the state acting through Torquemada aﬃrmatively sets out to
cause Doe’s excruciating pain. One could plausibly think that there is a
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moral distinction between deliberately causing suﬀering to achieve otherwise laudable state objectives—rescuing Doe’s mother’s hostages—and
incidentally preventing the cessation of suﬀering to achieve otherwise
laudable state objectives—avoiding coerced deaths, making palliative
care available, and so forth.²⁸
But even if it is morally worse for the state to aim at causing great suffering to innocents in order to rescue more innocents than it is for the
state to cause suﬀering to innocents as the incidental cost of other action,
does it follow that it is morally permissible for the state to take deliberate actions that cause innocents to suﬀer incidentally? Perhaps a better
analogy than torture is what we euphemistically call ‘collateral damage’
in wartime. The law of war forbids belligerent nations from targeting
civilians²⁹ and requires that strikes against combatants minimize civilian casualties,³⁰ but minimization is not prohibition. In war, high-value
enemy forces can be targeted even though some civilians will be injured
or killed as a collateral consequence.³¹
Does the same principle apply in civilian life? It would seem to. In
the United States, for example, police carry and use ﬁrearms against suspected criminals, with the predictable consequence that sometimes they
inadvertently injure or kill innocent bystanders.³² Similarly, throughout
the world vaccines against various deadly diseases predictably cause a
small number of the people vaccinated to contract the disease itself (or
suﬀer other ill eﬀects); yet that fact should not prevent the state from
mandating vaccination so as to greatly reduce the number of people who
would otherwise contract the disease by other means.³³ The person who
contracts the disease from the vaccine would appear to be at least as well
²⁸ See S. F. Colb, ‘Why is Torture “Diﬀerent” and How “Diﬀerent” is it?’ (forthcoming
in Volume 30 of Cardozo L. Rev. (2009)). In most of Colb’s examples, the state tortures
people who are not innocent.
²⁹ See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conﬂicts (Protocol 1) 1979, Arts. 48, 51 (‘The civilian
population . . . shall not be the object of attack.’).
³⁰ Ibid, Art. 57(2) (‘[T]hose who plan . . . an attack shall . . . take all feasible precautions . . . to avoid[], and in any event to minimiz[e], incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians and damage to civilian objects’).
³¹ Ibid: (combatants ‘shall refrain from . . . any attack which may be expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life . . . which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated’).
³² For a history of accidental killings of one oﬃcer by another in New York, see
A. O’Connor and S. Paciﬁci, ‘A Fatal Wound From a Colleague’s Weapon Is Rare, but
Always a Risk’ New York Times, 28 April, 2007, B5.
³³ See K. M. Malone and A. R. Hinman, ‘Vaccination Mandates: The Public Health
Imperative and Individual Rights’ in R. A. Goodman et al (eds.), Law in Public Health
Practices (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 264.
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positioned as James Poe to complain about the harm inﬂicted on him by
the state: for the beneﬁt of others, she, an innocent, has been required to
suﬀer and perhaps to die.

The Veil of Ignorance
To be sure, as a matter of public health, it may not make a great deal of
sense for the state to mandate full vaccination. So-called ‘herd immunity’
will work well enough to prevent the spread of most diseases, even with
vaccination rates falling somewhat short of 100 per cent.³⁴ Moreover,
imprisoning the parents of minor children or others who resist vaccination might prove counter-productive, inspiring distrust of public health
authorities. These are legitimate practical objections that I shall simply set
aside; I will assume that, for some particular disease, mandatory vaccination is essential for public health. In these circumstances, what justiﬁcation can the state give to the vaccine’s victim?
The state can say that, ex ante, the person who turned out to be a victim of the vaccine was much more likely to be its beneﬁciary. A rational
calculator, not knowing whether her child will be the 1 in 10,000 who
contracts the disease or one of the 9,999 children who beneﬁt from the
vaccine’s protection against it, would play the odds and have the vaccine
administered. In this instance, John Rawls’s metaphor of a veil of ignorance works especially well.³⁵ Prior to the vaccine’s administration, no-one
knows whether her child will be one of the many beneﬁciaries or one of
the small number of victims.
Perhaps more importantly, legislators do not know ex ante which particular individuals or groups of individuals will end up among the vaccine’s victims. Conscientious legislators who aim to adjust beneﬁts and
burdens fairly among their constituents will have no systematic reason to
under-count or over-count the welfare of any individual or group. If it
is rational for any parent to prefer the risks from the vaccine to the risks
from the disease if the vaccination is not given, it is rational for every parent to prefer the former risks. Thus, on the assumption that mandatory
vaccination truly serves public health better than voluntary vaccination,
in mandating vaccination, the legislature does not in fact prefer the wellbeing of the 9,999 to that of the one: it calculates that all 10,000 would
rationally prefer the smaller risk to the larger one.
³⁴ Ibid.
³⁵ See generally J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University
Press, 1999), 118–23.
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Critics of Rawls have sometimes objected that the veil of ignorance is
unrealistic.³⁶ How, they ask, could people living in the diverse circumstances in which persons in multicultural democracies ﬁnd themselves,
truly assess what the basic structure of their political institutions should
look like without at least some account—even if unconscious—of their
own particularity?³⁷ That is a sound objection to the Rawlsian veil of
ignorance but not much of an objection to mandatory vaccination, for
however diﬀerently individuals are situated with respect to other questions, they are nearly all in roughly the same position with respect to vaccines: nearly every rational actor would take the small risk of contracting
the disease from the vaccine rather than the substantially larger risk of
contracting the disease if unvaccinated.
I say ‘nearly all’ and ‘nearly every’ rather than ‘all’ and ‘every’ because
a small number of people object to vaccination on religious grounds,
and for them the calculus is quite diﬀerent.³⁸ For someone who believes
that vaccination will result in eternal damnation, even a substantial risk
of contracting a deadly disease if unvaccinated—10, 50, or even 90 per
cent, say—may be a risk worth running. In asking such religious persons
to don the veil of ignorance, we do potentially run foul of the broader
objection to the Rawlsian veil.
The treatment of religious objections to laws of general applicability
is an important question for any constitutional democracy, but we can
bracket it here. Within American constitutional law, religious objectors
are never entitled to faith-based exemptions from truly neutral laws,³⁹
although many of our states do provide for some religious exemptions⁴⁰ and a federal statute requires the federal government to justify
³⁶ For a summary of and response to such criticism, see S. Mulhall and A. Swift, ‘Rawls
and Communitarianism’ in S. Freeman (ed.), Cambridge Companion to Rawls (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 460–87.
³⁷ Ibid.
³⁸ For two families’ descriptions of their religious objections to vaccination, see Sherr
v Northport—E. Northport Union Free School District, 672 F. Supp. 81, 92–4 (EDNY
1987).
³⁹ Employment Div. v Smith, 494 US 872, 882, 110 SC 1595, 1602 (1990) (‘To make
an individual’s obligation to obey . . . a law [of general applicability] contingent upon the
law’s coincidence with his religious beliefs . . . contradicts both constitutional tradition and
common sense’).
⁴⁰ See, e.g., Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 1998 and Illinois
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 1998. Both of these state RFRAs invalidate
state laws that substantially burden religious exercise unless they are the least restrictive
means of furthering compelling government interests. For a list of all state religious freedom restoration acts as of 2007, see M. G. Kramer, ‘Humane Education, Dissection, and
the Law’ (2007) 13 Animal Law, 291 (citing state laws in Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut,
Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Missouri, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, and Texas).
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the application of general laws to religious objectors.⁴¹ Even in jurisdictions that do provide some religious exemptions, however, the government is not completely disabled from applying its general laws where
they happen to infringe on religious practices.⁴² Rather, the government
must simply meet a stricter standard of justiﬁcation.⁴³ In our example,
the health of minor children—assuming the vaccination provides signiﬁcant protection against a deadly disease—would likely count as suﬃcient
grounds for overcoming the religious scruples of parents,⁴⁴ although in
actual practice all but two American states have chosen to exempt parents
with such scruples from vaccination requirements.⁴⁵
For my present purposes, it is not important to resolve the question
whether the vaccination example is a case in which rational citizens have
more or less homogeneous ex ante interests and wishes. My point is only
that if we identify some such example of roughly homogeneous interests
and wishes—whether it involves vaccination or something else—the particularity-based objection to the Rawlsian veil of ignorance lacks bite.
But what about cases in which we agree that people are not ex ante similarly situated? These cases fall into two broad categories: those in which
persons objecting to having to bear the cost of prophylactic legislation are
politically dominant and those in which the objectors are politically subordinate. I shall illustrate these cases with examples based, respectively, on
torture and the detention of alleged terrorists.

A Moral Right to Demand Torture?
Suppose you are a conscientious legislator who does not believe on
deontological grounds that torture is always wrong. Nonetheless, you
⁴¹ Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 1993. RFRA was found unconstitutional as applied to the states in City of Boerne v Flores 521 US 507, 511, 117 SC 2157, 2160
(1997), but still restrains the federal government: Gonzales v O Centro Espirita Beneﬁcente
Uniao do Vegetal 546 US 418, 438, 126 SC 1211, 1225 (2006).
⁴² See e.g. Florida RFRA; Illinois RFRA, note 40 above.
⁴³ Ibid.
⁴⁴ Interests the Supreme Court has found ‘compelling’ include national security—Haig
v Agee 453 US 280, 307, 101 SC 2166, 2782 (1981)—and highway safety—Mackey v
Montrym 443 US 1, 17–9, 99 SC 2612, 2620–1 (1979). To date, most cases upholding laws
under state RFRA challenges have not reached the compelling interest test, instead ﬁnding
no substantial burden. See B. Porto, Annotation, ‘Validity, Construction, and Operation
of State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts’ (2004) 116 American Law Reports, 233.
⁴⁵ The most recent comprehensive data I have found are from 2004, and indicate that
only Mississippi and West Virginia deny religious exemptions from vaccination requirements. See ‘States with Religious and Philosophical Exemptions from Immunization
School Requirements’ (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2004), available at
<http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/2004exchart.htm>.
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favour an absolute ban on torture (such as the one contained in the
United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment) on prophylactic grounds.⁴⁶ In
principle, you believe that there are cases in which torture would be morally permissible or even required—for example, the well-known ‘ticking
bomb’ scenario: the authorities believe to a high degree of certainty that
they have in custody a person who knows but refuses to divulge the location of a ticking bomb that will cause catastrophic harm to the civilian
population. Nonetheless, you favour the absolute ban on torture because
you believe that, if the law makes any exceptions for ticking bombs, the
authorities will start to hear bombs ticking everywhere, and an extremely
limited exception will become the de facto rule.
These are reasonable grounds for favouring a blanket ban on torture
but suppose that a potential victim of the ticking bomb, whom I’ll call
Joe Blow, comes along and raises the following moral objection: in the
particular case in which your torture ban prevents the authorities from
ﬁnding and defusing the bomb that will kill or maim me, you are imposing on me, an innocent, a duty to rescue—or what amounts to the same
thing, a duty to sacriﬁce life or limb for—likely terrorists. Blow claims a
moral right to have the state engage in torture for his beneﬁt.
How might you respond to Blow’s objection? To begin, you can point
out that you are not demanding his sacriﬁce for the beneﬁt of the terrorist. If you favoured the torture ban on deontological grounds—if you
thought torture were inconsistent with human dignity, say—then you
would need to explain to Blow why your squeamishness about inﬂicting awful suﬀering on a suspected terrorist outweighs the suﬀering and
death of Blow and many of his fellow innocent citizens. (You would likely
rely on the act/omission distinction or something similar.) However, by
hypothesis, that is not the basis for your support of an absolute torture
ban. Instead, you worry that allowing any exceptions will lead to the
torture of innocent people or people from whom information could be
obtained by other means. If the risks are as you calculate, then this shift
to the ex ante perspective is, once again, an eﬀective response to the moral
objection to prophylactic legislation.
⁴⁶ The United Kingdom and the United States are both signatories, although the United
States has made a number of important reservations. See US Reservations, Declarations, and
Understandings, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, 136 Cong. Rec. S17486–01 (27 October 1990). For a list of
ratiﬁcations online, see <http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/
partI/chapterIV/treaty14.asp> and <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/cat/treaties/
convention-reserv.htm> (including text of reservation).
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However, even if the aggregate risks are indeed as you calculate, they
will not be distributed evenly. If Blow is a member of an ethnic, national,
or racial group whose members are responsible—or simply believed by
the authorities to be responsible—for a disproportionate share of terrorist
acts, Blow may indeed beneﬁt from the torture ban. But if he were in that
group, then ex ante at least, he would be quite unlikely to demand that the
legislature rescind the torture ban. Someone demanding that the state be
prepared to engage in torture in the ticking bomb scenario is much more
likely to be a member of a group that envisages the state torturing people
other than—and diﬀerent from—himself.
Thus, in this case, the veil of ignorance appears to succumb to the
standard objection that people are situated diﬀerently. A large number
of people believe that they will never be tortured, and thus some of them
want the state to use torture, at least in extreme cases. (Based on the popularity of the American television show ‘24’, in which hero Jack Bauer
routinely tortures bad guys, ‘some’ may actually be ‘a great many’.)⁴⁷ A
smaller number of people believe that, if the state uses torture, it will be
against people with their own characteristics. Ex ante, the calculation of
whether torture is justiﬁed will be diﬀerent for the two groups. Majority
group members may rationally conclude that it is worth increasing the
risk of torturing innocents in order to preserve the safety of the larger
innocent population because members of the majority group will not be
among the additional innocents risking torture. Minority group members are more likely to make the opposite calculation.
The conscientious legislator who believes that, all things considered,
the absolute torture ban is justiﬁed, need not give ground to the purportedly moral objection of Joe Blow and others like him. What they demand
is that the state shift the balance of risks and beneﬁts from torture away
from the majority and onto an ethnic, national, or religious minority.
This is not a demand in the name of morality addressed to the conscience
of the legislator but a demand in the name of self-interest addressed to the
legislator’s own interest in re-election. Legislators have suﬃciently ample
incentives to sacriﬁce minority interests for majority ones that we need
not worry much when it is claimed that a law sacriﬁces majority interests
for minority ones.
Indeed, the legislature’s incentive to favour—or at least not to disadvantage—the majority is so great that one is tempted to look for other
⁴⁷ For a discussion of torture on ‘24’ and the show’s growing popularity, see A. Stanley,
‘Suicide Bombers Strike, and America Is in Turmoil. It’s Just Another Day in the Life of
Jack Bauer’ New York Times, 12 January 2007, E1.
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explanations for laws, like the absolute torture ban, that seem to beneﬁt
the minority at the majority’s expense. Again putting aside the deontological objections to torture—which will also tend to beneﬁt the minority—
we can see at least one reason why the legislature might conclude that,
even from the perspective of the majority alone, an absolute torture ban
is cost-justiﬁed: the legislature might conclude that oﬃcially permitting
any torture will actually increase the net risk of terrorism, because it will
inspire additional hatred for the state. In one of his few commendable
displays of good sense, former US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
asked in a 2003 ‘snowﬂake’ whether US and allied forces were ‘capturing,
killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the
madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying
against’ the United States, thereby acknowledging that overly aggressive
actions can be counterproductive.⁴⁸
Another explanation for the torture ban could be that the legislature
does not in fact believe it will work. That may sound like a cynical view,
and some versions of this approach are cynical. For example, President
Bush made a great show of signing into law the Detainee Treatment Act of
2005, including a blanket prohibition on torture, only to issue an accompanying ‘signing statement’ that appears to reserve the power to engage
in torture anyway.⁴⁹
There is also, however, a less cynical basis on which a legislator could
support a torture ban despite knowing that it will not be fully eﬀective.
Suppose a legislator thinks that the state should sometimes torture, but
only in the very extreme version of the ticking bomb scenario. Any formal
exception in the law would have the unintended eﬀect of authorizing
more torture, but in suﬃciently extreme circumstances, the authorities
can be expected to break the law and engage in torture. Thus, the very
fact that police will be tempted to ignore an absolute torture ban when
the stakes are suﬃciently high could make the absolute ban the optimal
rule. In other words, if the conscientious legislator believes that the right
answer to the question ‘how often should the state torture?’ is not ‘never’
⁴⁸ See W. Shapiro, ‘Rumsfeld memo oﬀers honest display of doubts about war’ USA
Today, 24 October 2003, 5A. The full memorandum can be found at <http://media.
hoover.org/documents/0817945423_xxv.pdf>.
⁴⁹ See Statement by President George W. Bush upon signing Public Law 109–149,
2005 United States Code, Congressional and Administrative News, S54, in which Bush
reserves the right to construe the Detainee Treatment Act ‘in a manner [that is] consistent
with the constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive branch
and as Commander in Chief . . . [and] which will assist in . . . protecting the American people from further terrorist attacks’. See also C. Savage, ‘Bush Could Bypass New Torture
Ban’ Boston Globe, 4 January 2006, A1, noting legal specialists’ opinions that the ‘president’s
signing statement . . . raises serious questions about whether he intends to follow the law’.
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but ‘very very rarely’, then an absolute ban might come closer to achieving that outcome than any other rule. A legislative ‘never’ would mean
‘hardly ever’ in practice.
I cannot say with any conﬁdence whether these or other reasons explain
why we see complete bans on torture. I can say that, whether the torture ban is optimal or not in the aggregate, Joe Blow’s purportedly moral
objection to the state’s refusal to engage in torture rings hollow, even if
we set aside deontological justiﬁcations for a complete torture ban. The
objection rings hollow because the legislative process is well designed to
take account of the interests of people like Blow.
We can say nearly the same thing about assisted suicide. Although I
do not believe that, all things considered, assisted suicide bans are costjustiﬁed, if one did think that they were cost-justiﬁed in the aggregate,
the ex ante distribution of beneﬁts and risks would suﬃciently answer
our hypothetical James Poe, who objects to the imposition on him of the
costs needed to avoid harms that a regime of legal assisted suicide would
supposedly inﬂict on others. By hypothesis, assisted suicide bans protect
society’s most vulnerable members, and so if Poe opposes the ban, he
is unlikely to be such a person. Instead, like Joe Blow (who complains
about the torture ban), Poe should be able to get a fair hearing in the
legislature.⁵⁰
More broadly, we can say that the heterogeneity of the distribution of
risks does not render prophylactic legislation immoral where the dominant group bears the added risk of a law’s overbreadth. This conclusion
has obvious implications for other sorts of laws that protect minorities at
the seeming expense of the majority, but I shall not address them here.⁵¹

Detention Without Full Trial
Members of minority groups who bear the brunt of prophylactic
legislation present a much stronger moral objection, however. Let us
⁵⁰ Recall that I am assuming that religious opposition to assisted suicide is not the
reason for the prohibition. If that assumption does not hold, then Poe may well count as
a religious minority whose welfare the legislature should not be able to sacriﬁce for the
welfare of others.
⁵¹ American constitutionalists will see in my analysis a healthy dose of so-called ‘representation-reinforcing’ theory of the sort propounded most famously by the late John
Hart Ely. See generally J. H. Ely, Democracy & Distrust (London: Harvard University Press,
1980). Ely argued for careful judicial scrutiny of laws that disadvantage politically disempowered groups such as racial minorities and other victims of prejudice, but maintained
that the outputs of a reasonably well-functioning political process should not be secondguessed by courts when they disadvantage majority interests for minority ones. See Ely,
Democracy at 135–79.
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consider their objection in the context of detention without a full civilian trial.
A familiar maxim states that it is better for ten guilty men to go free than
for one innocent to be unjustly convicted. Common-law legal systems
institutionalize this maxim through a number of procedural mechanisms, including: trial by jury in serious criminal cases; the requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt; and the exclusion of evidence obtained
through means that cast doubt on its reliability.⁵² However, since 11
September 2001 in the US and 7 July 2005 in the UK, some commentators have argued that the ten-to-one ratio is inappropriate for persons
suspected of terrorism.⁵³
Two rationales might be thought to justify relaxing the procedural rules
that implement the ten-to-one principle. First, terrorists who commit
their crimes by suicide cannot be deterred by the threat of after-the-fact
criminal punishment. Thus, authorities must intervene before they have
completed their plans, but separating those with innocent intentions
from those with guilty intentions will often prove more diﬃcult than
determining guilt for a completed act. Indeed, some of the persons the
state may wish to detain will not have even committed an inchoate crime,
but are nonetheless highly dangerous. The perceived need for early apprehension may create a concomitant perceived need for a lower threshold of
certainty before the state apprehends and detains people.
Second, terrorists aim to produce destruction on a greater scale than
other criminals. The cost of freeing ten ordinary murderers in order to
avoid wrongly incarcerating one innocent person accused of murder is,
according to the ten-to-one maxim, a high cost but one worth bearing. It
does not follow that the cost is worth bearing when we have ten extraordinary murderers. In other words, to the extent that the ten-to-one maxim
encapsulates a civil-libertarian-weighted cost-beneﬁt analysis, the analysis may be diﬀerent for terrorism.
In my country, these factors may partly explain why the Bush
administration has generally sought to avoid trying terrorism suspects
in civilian courts according to the usual rules of the criminal justice

⁵² For an overview of US criminal law procedure and the ways in which it ‘reﬂects
a desire to minimize the chance of convicting an innocent person even at the price of
increasing the chance that a guilty person may escape’, see LaFave et al, Criminal Procedure
(St. Paul, Minn: West 2004), 30.
⁵³ See e.g. J. Tyrangiel, ‘The Jihadi Next Door?’ 168 Time, 3 July 2006, 26 (arguing
that ‘when a handful of terrorists can trigger an exponentially larger tragedy . . . “[y]ou ﬁnd
a reversal of the general posit that it is suﬃcient that 100 guilty men go free so that one
innocent man is not convicted” ’) (quoting Ronald Susskind).
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system.⁵⁴ Instead, the administration has relied on military tribunals for
both determinations of combatant status and some criminal prosecutions.⁵⁵ Initially, military jurisdiction was asserted over US citizens as
well as aliens, and our Supreme Court approved of that approach (even
as it rejected the administration’s claim of unreviewable authority).⁵⁶
However, the Military Commissions Act of 2006 made clear that henceforth only aliens would be subject to adjudication by military tribunals
under looser rules than apply in civilian courts.⁵⁷
If we take the ten-to-one ratio as the background operating assumption of common-law legal systems, then the use of any set of procedures
that substitutes a higher ratio of false positives to false negatives can be
understood as prophylactic legislation. Suppose, for example, a legislator believes that, given the need for early intervention and given the
size of the harm perpetrated by terrorists, the proper maxim is ‘better to
imprison three innocent people at Guantánamo Bay than to mistakenly
free one determined terrorist’. Based on this one-to-three rather than tento-one ratio (of false negatives to false positives), the government would
use procedures that reduce the number of dangerous people released but
at the cost of increasing the number of innocent and harmless people
imprisoned or killed.
Now suppose that, when we apply the same discount factor as we apply
in civilian life to produce the ten-to-one rule, we obtain the one-to-three
rule for terrorism cases. In that case, the conscientious legislator could give
our by-now-familiar answer to someone who objects to the increased risk
of erroneous incarceration or execution for terrorism suspects: ex ante, the
risk is justiﬁed because it applies the proper discount factor for balancing your risk of being improperly incarcerated by the state against your
risk of being harmed or killed by a terrorist improperly released or never
apprehended by the state.
⁵⁴ For a discussion of post-11 September use of military tribunals and immigration
authorities to ‘bypass the criminal process’ in detaining terror suspects, see D. Cole, ‘The
New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism’ (2003) 38 Harvard Civil
Rights–Civil Liberties Law Review, 22–7; R. B. Schmitt, ‘Sidestepping Courts in the War
on Terrorism’ Los Angeles Times, 30 November 2005, A18. For a review of detentions and
trials of suspected terrorists from 2001–2007, see J. T. Parry, ‘Terrorism and the New
Criminal Process’ (2007) 15 William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal, 770–82.
⁵⁵ See Parry, ibid, 770–82. For a description of the military tribunal review process for
enemy combatant status determination, see T. Golden, ‘For Guantánamo Review Boards,
Limits Abound’ New York Times, 31 December 2006, 1.
⁵⁶ Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 542 US 507, 519, 124 SC 2633, 2640 (2004) (‘There is no bar to
this Nation’s holding one of its own citizens as an enemy combatant’).
⁵⁷ See Military Commissions Act (MCA) 2006 s. 948(c), deﬁning ‘[p]ersons subject to
military commissions’ as ‘[a]ny alien unlawful enemy combatant’.
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However, we also have our familiar rejoinder: the risk of being mistakenly imprisoned as a terrorist and the risk of being harmed or killed by a
terrorist who was not detained because the authorities lacked suﬃcient
evidence to hold him are heterogeneously distributed. People in certain
national, ethnic, and religious minority groups—especially Muslims—
will suﬀer a much higher risk of erroneous imprisonment than will the
majority population.⁵⁸ Providing fewer procedural rights to aliens than to
citizens—as under the Military Commissions Act in the United States—
exacerbates the problem, because it subjects precisely those without political power to the increased risk.⁵⁹ However, the problem persists even if
we envisage a special response to terrorism that applies equally to citizens
and non-citizens, because, as a practical matter, the nominally inclusive
programme will still expose Muslims (and some members of other minority groups) to greater false positive risk than the false positive risk borne
by the balance of the population.
And that will be so even if we assume no bad faith or invidious prejudice on the part of the authorities. The fact—and I’ll assume it is a fact for
purposes of this example—that a Muslim is more likely to be a terrorist
than a non-Muslim, even though the overwhelming majority of Muslims
are perfectly innocent, will lead the authorities to concentrate their investigation on individuals who happen to be Muslim. That will be true even
if the authorities speciﬁcally disavow religion as an element of a ‘terrorist
proﬁle’, because, by hypothesis, simply following speciﬁc clues will more
frequently lead the authorities to Muslim suspects.
Thus we come to the hard question: can the conscientious legislator authorize counter-terrorism policies that, while cost-justiﬁed in the
aggregate, expose innocent members of a religious minority group to a
substantially greater risk of erroneous detention than the risk that the
balance of the population faces? In my discussion of torture, I concluded
that there is no strong moral objection of potential terrorism victims to a
decision not to expose members of a minority group to a greater risk, and
that answer should not change whether the risk is torture or unwarranted
imprisonment. So the conscientious legislator can vote to provide fulldress civilian court criminal trials to all terrorism suspects; if she does so,
she might pay a political price but she should be able to sleep at night.
However, suppose our conscientious legislator is either attentive to polls
or an insomniac. Can she give a persuasive answer to the moral objection
⁵⁸ For discussion of the relationship between law enforcement and Muslim communities in the US after 11 September, see A. Elliot, ‘After 9/11, Arab-Americans Fear Police
Acts, Study Finds’ New York Times, 12 June 2006, A15.
⁵⁹ See MCA ss 948(q), 949(a), 950(a).
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of the minority victim of prophylactic legislation? Before addressing that
question, I want to register a caveat concerning how we should measure
costs and beneﬁts.

The Caveat: Total Risk
First, the caveat. I have been talking as though the proper way for a legislator to assess the distribution of risk from a proposed law is to look at
the distribution of risks and beneﬁts from that law alone. Yet a better
approach may be to tally up the distribution of risks and beneﬁts from the
entirety of government policy. If the optimal policy with respect to one
phenomenon—vaccination against disease A, say—exposes one group to
a disproportionately greater share of the risk than the general population
faces, might that policy be justiﬁed by the fact that this group disproportionately beneﬁts from some other policy—such as vaccination against
disease B—or even something completely unrelated, such as trial by jury
in criminal cases? I see no reason in principle why, from the ex ante perspective, a conscientious legislator could not take this approach. Doing
so enables the legislature to pursue policies that are optimal in terms of
their aggregate costs and beneﬁts without succumbing to distributional
objections, by balancing the distributional consequences across diﬀerent
policy domains. We might call this approach ‘distributional arbitrage’.
There are, however, at least two substantial diﬃculties with distributional arbitrage. The ﬁrst is availability. Across policy domains, the same
people tend to get the short end of the stick. For example, the distributional arbitrageur looking for a policy to balance the disproportionate
risk that the poor will bear from a decision to site a sewage plant in their
neighbourhood will ﬁnd that most of the other policies on oﬀer also disproportionately expose the poor to risk.
To be sure, government programmes of redistribution, including
entitlements and progressive taxation, do disproportionately beneﬁt
the poor, including the most disadvantaged members of disadvantaged
minority groups. But this brings us to the second diﬃculty with distributional arbitrage: once we resolve to consider total beneﬁts and burdens
of government policy, there is no natural baseline from which to measure
beneﬁts and burdens.
Can the conscientious legislator vote for a regime of hyper-aggressive
criminal law enforcement that will disproportionately expose poor minorities to the risk of erroneous imprisonment on the ground that most of
these people disproportionately beneﬁt from progressive taxation? If so,
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how should the conscientious legislator take account of the fact that the
wealthy disproportionately beneﬁt from legal protection of private property? Policy arbitrage may make sense in principle but in practice it would
be likely to license legislators to ignore distributional objections, because
one can always ﬁnd some policy that disproportionately beneﬁts whatever group complains about the disproportionate burden a proposed law
would impose on them.

Conclusion
In the end, I doubt that the legislature can give a persuasive response to
the disadvantaged minority group member who is subject to prophylactic legislation which, even if optimal in the aggregate, fails of its background justiﬁcation in his case—such as the law-abiding Muslims who
are imprisoned or tortured in the mistaken belief that they pose a terrorist
threat.
Indeed, I am not even very conﬁdent in the response I have outlined
for cases of homogeneously distributed risks and risks that advantaged
members of the society disproportionately bear. Recall that, in these
cases, the conscientious legislator says to the unfortunate soul caught up
by the overbroad law that he was an ex ante beneﬁciary. But can’t he still
complain?
Suppose that the ﬁve starving survivors of a shipwreck realize that they
must kill and eat one of their number if the remaining four are to have
a hope of surviving until they are rescued. The person who draws the
short straw was an ex ante beneﬁciary of the procedure because a four-inﬁve chance of living another few days is better than the near-certainty of
death in another few hours. Still, that hardly ensures the morality of the
procedure once the procedurally fair decision has been made to sacriﬁce
him for the beneﬁt of the others—even in the case in which he consents
to the lottery. It would take an extraordinary commitment to procedural
fairness for the person drawing the short straw not to regard himself (in
his last moments of life) as having been wronged.
Now note that, in the case of prophylactic legislation, the people who
end up bearing the brunt of the law’s deliberate overbreadth need not
have actually agreed with the law, so long as, ex ante, our conscientious
legislator believes that the law would be in their interest. James Poe,
whose suﬀering is prolonged by the blanket prohibition on assisted suicide, can liken himself to the shipwreck survivor who does not consent to
the drawing of straws, is outvoted by his fellow survivors, and then draws
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the short straw. Perhaps in the case of the shipwreck and for all prophylactic legislation that impinges on fundamental interests, we expect that
grim necessity will overwhelm considerations of morality. If so, we might
say that prophylactic legislation, like the survivors’ cannibalism lottery, is
sometimes forgivable, not that it is moral. We cannot even say that much
where the legislation imposes disproportionately greater risks on vulnerable groups than on others.
The conscientious legislator may thus be tempted simply to avoid
prophylactic legislation whenever it would implicate fundamental interests. But even that path will often be unavailable because there will be no
way to craft a legal principle that is not over-inclusive with respect to some
people. A categorical rule forbidding torture will potentially deprive terrorism victims of their lives because the state fails to discover and defuse
the ticking bomb; a rule permitting torture will result in the torture of
innocents; and the state cannot simply do nothing.
Thus, ﬁnally, with moral objections in all directions, the legislator
may feel liberated to do whatever he wishes to maximize utility or pursue
whatever other policy aims he favours. In my view, that approach would
also be inappropriate. The impossibility of overcoming moral objections
is not a reason to fail to grapple with them. In the recent past, and especially in the halls of power in my own country, public oﬃcials have far too
quickly set aside moral considerations in favour of short-sighted views of
expediency. Morality may sometimes need to bow to expediency, but it
should not go down without a ﬁght.
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